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Abstract—The ubiquitous application of emerging blockchain
technology in numerous technological projects leads to a tremen-
dous hype. The significantly high prices of digital currencies and
initial coin offerings as the new funding approach has fostered
the public perception of blockchain as a cure-all and driven the
hype even further. In this evolution, a clear view of the reasonable
application of blockchain technology is not given and therefore,
the purposeful use of traditional technologies is undermined.
To clarify this situation, we derive a novel decision model
for evaluating the applicability of blockchain technology that
considers two key factors: the remediation of central governance
and the management of digital objects. Based on these key
factors, we closely analyse the domain of identity management
for conscious blockchain application. Finally, we examine uPort,
Sovrin, and ShoCard as distinct projects in this scope with regard
to the inevitable necessity to implement a blockchain by using
our decision model.
Index Terms—Blockchain, distributed ledger technology, iden-
tity management, digital identity
I. INTRODUCTION
AMYRIAD of projects applies blockchain technologyto innovatively address existing challenges [1]. Thus,
blockchain technology seems to be perceived by the public
as a cure-all to solve numerous issues relating to technology
in general or security in particular. Applications range from
the irreversible and transparent documentation of financial
transactions, peer to peer lending and decentralised exchanges
to investments in the financial domain. In identity manage-
ment, numerous projects are concerned with the creation of
self-sovereign identities, new identity provider models and
solutions for people lacking official identity documents [2].
The reason behind why blockchain is often presented as
the unavoidable solution in use cases is generally missing.
Blockchain technology is a composition of individual parts, for
instance, digital signatures, cryptographic hashes and peer to
peer communication. Therefore, a dedicated usage of separate
components might be more efficient in certain scenarios.
The various projects require funding for the development of
their ideas until a sufficient revenue stream is established.
Using blockchain technology, a new funding and investment
approach is created based on the distribution of tokens in
exchange for capital. The preliminary token sale is named
the initial coin offering. Later on, these tokens are listed on
exchanges for trading against other tokens or fiat currencies.
The value of a token may fluctuate significantly leading to
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its speculative nature. Tremendously rising prices of digital
currencies at the end of 2017 [3] and tokens, after the initial
coin offering, promised a serious return on investment. The
overall situation led to blockchain’s increased popularity and
initiated a certain ”gold rush” accompanied by widespread
scams [4] and the use of the term blockchain as a buzzword
for better marketing and as a way to attract funding.
The hype about blockchain technology in general and specif-
ically for identity management goes along with the increase
in projects and funding on the basis of initial coin offering.
A detailed rationale for applying blockchain technology is
not available for all initiatives, leading to an unclear added
value compared to conventional solutions. Taking this as our
motivation, we derive a novel decision model for the applica-
bility of blockchain technology that considers the remediation
of central governance and the management of digital objects
as key factors. Thereafter, we closely analyse the domain of
identity management according to the deduced key factors
to identify appropriate scenarios. Additionally, we examine
uPort, Sovrin and ShoCard, as representatives for distinct
implementation strategies of identity projects, regarding the
essential use of blockchain technology by applying our novel
decision model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2 we outline related work comprising decision models. Key
factors for blockchain technology are described in Section 3.
A detailed analysis of identity management and blockchain
technology is covered in Section 4. Subsequently, we scrutinise
the three mentioned projects in Section 5 and present out
conclusion in Section 6.
II. RELATED WORK
Analysing the effective and necessary use of blockchain
technology in various domains lead to the creation of decision
models for this purpose. Wu¨st and Gervais [5] propose a
flow chart to decide on the usage of a permissionless, public
permissioned, private permissioned blockchains or whether
to apply conventional technology instead. The decision tree
takes into consideration the necessity to store a state, quantity,
and identifiability of writers, the possibility to use a trusted
third party and the requirement to have public verifiability. In
addition to that, the developed decision model is applied in
the areas of supply chain management, interbank and interna-
tional payments, and decentralised autonomous organizations.
In contrast, we focus our analysis on the domain identity
management and strongly consider the remediation of central
governance and the management of digital objects.
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2In 2015 Suchies [6] published another decision model for the
usage of blockchain. The flow chart distinguishes the appli-
cation of conventional technology, public, private or hybrid
blockchains. Requirements relating to a database, shared write
access, trust in writers, the need for a trusted third party
and confidentiality of transaction data is mainly considered
in the decision process. In contrast to our decision model, the
nature of the blockchain managed object is not considered.
Additionally, the decision process is not applied to a domain.
Birch et al. [7] publish the Birch-Brown-Parulava model to
decide on the use of either private or public blockchains. The
model focuses on the financial sector and takes the commu-
nication and integrity of transactions into consideration. In
contrast, we focus on the identity management domain and
apply the remediation of central governance and the texture
of the managed object in our decision process.
Lewis [8] proposes a decision model that takes a business
perspective and considers the general hype about blockchain.
The decision process separates the use of blockchain and the
application of a regular database. The work flow considers the
solution of a real business problem and scrutinises alternatives
prior to the invention of blockchain technology. Furthermore,
the model incorporates aspects of control, replacement of
systems and visibility of data. Compared to our decision
model, a dedicated application of the work flow to a certain
domain is not available.
A further model is published by the Department of Homeland
Security [9]. This decision model concentrates on evaluating
the general use of blockchain. A shared data store, data
contributors, modification of data records, the critical nature of
the stored data and other factors are taken into consideration
by the decision tree. In contrast to our work, a detailed analysis
of the identity management domain is not comprised.
Overall, several decision models regarding the reasonable use
of blockchain technology, covering the types private, public
and hybrid, are proposed. The models are applied to the supply
chain management, financial technology and decentralised
autonomous organization. To the best of our knowledge, the
identity management domain is not examined so far.
III. KEY FACTORS FOR APPLYING BLOCKCHAIN
Two key factors for evaluating the essential use of
blockchain technology are derivable from its origin as decen-
tralised digital cash scheme. These key considerations build
the foundation of our decision model.
A. Remediation of Central Governance
Digital cash schemes are proposed prior to Bitcoin. The
electronic cash of Chaum et al. [10] is an example. However,
Nakamoto’s Bitcoin proposal solved for the first time the dou-
ble spending problem without requiring a trusted third party
and achieved an entirely decentralised digital cash scheme.
In earlier approaches, preventing double spending required a
trusted third party as central governance mechanism due to the
arbitrarily copyable nature of digital cash [11]. In Bitcoin, the
central governance is remediated by a peer-to-peer consensus
algorithm and enforced decentralisation in the blockchain
network. Therefore, a key factor for applying blockchain is
the remediation of the need to trust a central governance body
and distributing trust into a decentralised network of equitable
peers without hierarchy.
In an alleviated version, trust requirements are transitioned
from one party to several parties, potentially not covering all
nodes of the blockchain network. To enable the trust shift,
the rules that are supervised by the central governance body
are required to be digitally represented and enforceable in the
decentralised network.
Overall, using blockchain technology and introducing cen-
tralised trust dependencies counteract each other. Architectures
that are built in this regard may better use conventional
technology.
B. Management of Digital Objects
Another key factor for the reasonable use of blockchain is
the type of commodity that is managed using a decentralised
network. An inherently digital item, comparable to digital
cash, is primarily suited to this scenario. There is no need
to construct a digital representation of a physical object and
link both securely together.
Additionally, it is important to consider the transition from the
outside world into the blockchain environment and vice versa.
Digital cash, as a general purpose good, is able to ideally
solve this challenge. Coins of digital cash are directly created
during mining in the blockchain network. In addition to that,
digital cash can be exchanged from and to fiat currencies by
using central or decentralised exchanges. Buying goods and
services is another channel to transition from the blockchain
environment.
At the same time, the creation of a digital representation needs
to be thoroughly studied to provide the required benefit and
support an appropriate use of blockchain. Storing a crypto-
graphic hash of a document on the blockchain, to show that
it exists at a specific point in time, is an appropriate scenario
for creating a certain association. In contrast, preserving the
ownership of valuable art by logging the possessor and char-
acteristics of a picture on a blockchain tends to be ineffective,
due to the loose binding between data on the blockchain and
the picture as a physical object in the real world [12].
A solution to process external input on blockchain-based
applications is an oracle. An oracle is queried during the
execution of a decentralised program and provides the required
information. Depending on the structure of the oracle, a trusted
third party might be introduced and the first key factor is
impaired. As an example, SchellingCoins [13] are a proposal
for a decentralised oracle.
Overall, an artificially created digital association may un-
dermine the original purpose or limit or even eliminate,
respectively, the benefit of applying blockchain technology.
IV. DECISION MODEL
Considering the key factors and further properties of
blockchain technology, we devise a new decision model for
applying blockchain technology. The decision work flow is
shown in Figure 2. In general, the graph is divided into two
3sections. These stages refer to the use case for implementing
blockchain and the architecture of the actual solution.
In the use case section, the first decision step targets the
replacement of a trusted third party. In case the objective of
the evaluated scenario is not to replace a trusted third party,
and therefore does not share trust in a decentralised network of
nodes, other technologies are better suited. The replacement of
a trusted third party is the primary application of blockchain
technology on the basis of decentralised consensus among
equitable peers. Subsequently, the texture of the objects that
should be managed by the blockchain network is analysed.
Either the objects are inherently digital, for instance, a digital
currency or a digital representation of the object is possible.
The mapping of a physical object to its digital representation
needs to avoid the introduction of a new centralised entity that
is responsible for the relation. This would again introduce a
trusted third party that counteracts the remediation of central
governance. Afterwards, the rules, that needs to be enforced
on the managed objects, are assessed. In general, a central
authority put rules into effect to control certain behaviour.
These rules must be digitally enforceable to be distributed in a
decentralised blockchain network. A potential source of cen-
tralisation is introduced, if rules are required to be exclusively
or partially enforced outside the blockchain environment. The
use case qualifies for applying blockchain technology if all
decision steps are appropriately confirmed.
The second part of the decision model evaluates the archi-
tecture of the solution. First of all, a decision about the
demand for a consented and decentralised data storage is
required. Data within this storage is decentrally distributed
to the nodes and agreed by the nodes of the network. On the
one hand, exclusively peer to peer communication should be
considered in case such a data storage is not required. On
the other hand, if a data storage is required, the next step is
the analysis of special permissions for the actors within the
solution architecture. Actors are reflected by the nodes of the
blockchain network itself or any other additional entity that
interacts with the blockchain-based architecture. No special
privileges are required by the nodes in case an unpermissioned
blockchain is used. Subsequently, the end of the work flow is
reached, determining a suitable architecture for implementing
blockchain technology. In case a permissioned blockchain
is applied that requires special rights or differentiates the
rights of the nodes, an analysis on how these privileges are
granted is conducted. If the privileges are assigned by a
trusted third party, a centralised dependency is introduced
and the architecture may disqualify itself for using blockchain
technology. Otherwise, the application of blockchain seems to
be reasonable when privileges are granted in a decentralised
way and not by a trusted third party.
V. APPLICABILITY OF BLOCKCHAIN IN IDENTITY
MANAGEMENT
In this section we examine the identity management domain
outlining the functional scope, presenting trusted third parties
as well as managed artefacts. We evaluate the general applica-
bility of a blockchain concerning the first stage of our decision
model.
A. Identity Management
Identity management subsumes the administration, in terms
of creation, modification, and deletion, of digital identities.
A digital identity is the electronic representation of a person
or entity in the real world. The digital identity comprises
attributes and is referenced by an identifier [14]. Attributes
are used to specify information about identity.
Digital identities are used in the identification, authentication
and authorization process to legitimately grant access in ap-
plications for the respective subject. Identification describes
the process to reference a certain entity by an identifier.
Authentication is the operation to ascertain that an entity is in
control of a specific digital identity. The owner proves control
by using a credential. Authorization is the process to validate
that a digital identity is entitled to execute a specific function
or access particular data.
User
Identity  
Provider
Relying  
PartyCreate and
Maintain Identity
Access Service
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Fig. 1. Trusted Third Parties
B. Trusted Third Parties
Digital identities are provided respectively and used by
different actors (see Figure 1). The user or subject creates a
digital identity at an identity provider. Additionally, the user
provides information about attributes and maintains them to
cater for updates. The identity provider offers identity related
services, for instance, authentication and authorization. The
identity provider may verify the correctness and validity of
attributes of a digital identity. Digital identities are used at
relying parties. A relying party is a service provider that needs
to identify its users and, therefore, utilises the service of an
identity provider. A user controls the respective digital identity
with a credential. The described entities are classes of actors.
For each category, several actors exist and these are commonly
used in realistic scenarios. In a specific trust context, the
relying party and the identity provider might belong to the
same organization. However, in the following analysis, we
consider the user, the identity provider and the relying party
as distinct trusted third parties for the respective other entities.
TTP 1: The User
Usually, the user is not seen as a particular trusted third party,
but represents a group that is trusted for common factors
by the identity provider and the relying party. The user is
primarily trusted to keep the credential for controlling the
digital identity secret [15]. Thus, the identity can be solely
used by the user itself. In case the credentials are published
4or available to different users, actions that are done with
the digital identity cannot be attributed to a specific user.
Furthermore, services provided by the relying party to certain
users might be consumed by others using the same digital
identity. Besides the confidentiality of the credential, the user
is secondarily trusted to a particular extent for maintaining
that non-essential attributes at the identity provider to be
valid and up-to-date.
TTP 2: The Identity Provider
The user and the relying party trust the identity provider to
solely allow the legitimate subject to control the respective
digital identity and, therefore, to conduct correct authentication
[16]. Additionally, the identity provider is trusted to adhere
to agreed data privacy principles. The user expects that its
data is kept confidential and is only disclosed to authorised
parties when necessary [15].
The user and the relying party expect a stable service by
the identity provider according to contractual agreements.
Especially, the user requires no unfounded rejection on
using the service that is offered by the identity provider or
arbitrary revocation of the owned identity. Furthermore, the
relying party trusts the identity provider for the validity and
correctness of critical attributes. Usually, the identity provider
is mandated to verify attributes that are essential for the
relying party.
TTP 3: The Relying Party
The user trusts the relying party to accept the digital identity
and required attributes stored by the identity provider to access
the requested service. The relying party is trusted to provide
the offered service and uses the gathered information about
the user solely for the consented case. A misuse of user data
is neither expected by the identity provider nor the user.
C. Manageable Objects
In identity management, the administrated objects are digital
identities and their associated attributes. Attributes can reflect
arbitrary information about the digital identity. We differentiate
between two categories of attributes: property and permission.
A property is a statement about the digital identity to more
closely specify its appearance. This type of attribute relates to
information about the owner. A permission is a privilege within
an application, for instance, to execute a specific function or
to read or write certain data.
D. Evaluation
We apply the first section of our decision model to generally
evaluate the domain of identity management. The replacement
of a trusted third party, the management of digital objects and
the digital enforcement of rules are considered.
The user, the relying party and the identity provider are the
essential trusted third parties in identity management. The user
is predominantly trusted to keep the authentication credential
secret. Blockchain technology does not provide a means to
remove this trust requirement. Therefore, the user must still
be trusted to keep the credential secret.
The trust in the relying party targets its behaviour of accepting
digital identities, providing an agreed service and using data
appropriately. Processes of the relying party can be imple-
mented by using smart contracts on a public blockchain.
The processes and its outcome are commonly verifiable as
a result. The reduction of trust significantly depends on the
implemented processes of the relying party’s organizational
and business model. External dependencies that act as points
of centralisation might be required to fully reflect business
processes. Additionally, the processes may differ considerably
between the different actors in this category. Therefore, a
general assessment of the applicability of blockchain is not
possible and we do not continue considering the relying party
in the evaluation process.
The identity provider holds the most trust requirements, from
both the user and the relying party, referencing the adequate
user authentication, stable service delivery, adherence to data
privacy and the verification of attributes. Additionally, different
actors in this category have a largely congruent set of pro-
cesses. Blockchain technology enables a decentralised imple-
mentation of an identity provider in the form of smart contracts
or as a separate blockchain to remediate the trust requirements.
The public verifiability of the implemented processes achieves
transparent behaviour of users and relying parties. The general
availability of the service is bound in a decentralised way to the
participants of the blockchain network. Therefore, the identity
provider as core actor in identity management is an ideal
trusted third party to be replaced by blockchain technology.
The identity provider manages digital identities that are com-
prised of an identifier and attributes. The identifier and per-
missions are inherently digital considering the pure digital
use and origin in applications. A user’s digital identity is
referenced by an identifier and permissions are assigned and
checked within applications. Therefore, no mapping to the
physical world needs to be applied. In the same way, properties
are digitally stored and distributed to the respective entities.
However, assessing the validity and correctness of a property is
challenging, as it reflects a physical characteristic of the user.
The age or address of a person, for instance, can hardly be
verified without knowing the person. To avoid the introduction
of centralisation by relying on a specific verification provider,
properties can be modelled as verifiable claims [17], that are
comprised of claims and attestations. A claim is a statement
about the digital identity and an attestation is the verification
of this statement. Having numerous attestation issuers that
attest one claim several times prevents centralisation towards
one verifier. In addition, it might be an approach to establish
confidence in a property in a decentralised manner.
After devising a trusted third party and the managed objects,
the next step is to assess that all rules are digitally enforceable.
The identity provider’s rules are related to identification,
authentication and authorization. These processes are digitally
depictable. Therefore, the query for digitally enforceable rules
is answered positively.
Overall, the identity provider is a trusted third party that
applies digitally enforceable rules to digitally manageable
objects leading to a scenario where blockchain technology can
be applied reasonably.
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6VI. PROJECT REVIEW
There are a large number of blockchain-based identity
management projects that target the implementation of a
decentralised identity provider. We have chosen uPort, Sovrin,
and ShoCard, which provide a wide range of solution archi-
tectures to analyse the applicability of blockchain technology
according to the second phase of our decision model.
A. uPort
On the public and unpermissioned Ethereum blockchain,
uPort [18] implements a decentralised identity provider using
several smart contracts. The proxy, controller and recovery
contract principally outlines a digital identity. The proxy
contract’s address serves as a constant identifier of the digital
identity. The digital identity is managed by the controller
contract, and the recovery contract provides the means to
restore the authentication credential. Furthermore, a central
smart contract is used as a verifiable claims registry.
A distributed data storage is implicitly utilised on the
Ethereum blockchain by taking the proxy contract’s address
as an identifier. Additionally, the verifiable claims registry
directly stores data regarding attributes on the blockchain.
Therefore, a consented and decentralised data storage is ap-
plied for this solution. As the Ethereum blockchain is public
and unpermissioned there are no special privileges required
for the nodes of the network. Additionally, there are no other
access restrictions introduced that are bound to a trusted
third party. Ethereum and uPort are transparently and openly
available to the public. In summary, uPort is a decentralised
identity provider applying a solution architecture that is a
perfect fit for using blockchain technology.
B. Sovrin
Sovrin [19] is a decentralised identity provider that is imple-
mented as a set of dedicated blockchains for identity manage-
ment. These blockchains store identity as well as config related
information and apply the public and permissioned model.
Furthermore, a voting ledger is used to assigned permissions
to the nodes. Nodes of the network are differentiated into
validators and observers. Validator nodes have the privilege
of forging the next block, which includes transactions. In
contrast, observer nodes exclusively read the blockchain data.
A digital identity consists of an identifier and attributes that are
represented as claims and attestations. Sovrin is governed by a
foundation adhering to a comprehensive trust framework. The
main decision council is the Board of Trustees [20]. Members
of this board can appoint new members and select stewards
according to rules. Stewards are entities that operate validator
nodes.
The Sovrin system utilises a blockchain-based data storage
to store the identifier and, in certain cases, the attributes on
the blockchain. Therefore, the requirement of a consented and
decentralised data storage is fulfilled. As Sovrin implements a
public and permissioned blockchain, nodes, in particular val-
idators, require special privileges to participate in the network.
These privileges are assigned based on a quorum of the Board
of Trustees. Depending on the structure of this panel, it can
be perceived as a trusted third party that finally makes the
decision. In case the Board of Trustees is comprised of a large
number of members with a very diverse background, it may
not be perceived as a trusted third party.
Overall, Sovrin provides a blockchain-based identity man-
agement system with the objective to be decentralised. Nev-
ertheless, centralisation is introduced to a certain extent by
establishing a strict trust framework and governance bodies.
A future diversification of the Board of Trustees will show the
evolution to or away from a trusted third party. Therefore, at
this time we cannot make a final decision on the applicability
of blockchain.
C. ShoCard
ShoCard [21] is a blockchain-based identity provider plat-
form that is roughly described in a white paper. Detailed
information is, however, lacking. The platform is split into
three tiers: the application layer, ShoCard core services, and
the blockchain layer. On the application layer, end user and
server side solutions exist to connect to the core services
tier. The ShoCard core services act as middleware and are
comprised of ShoServer, ShoStore, side chains and a caching
infrastructure. ShoServer and ShoStore act as an intermediary
to negotiate write actions to the side chains and the blockchain
layer. The blockchain layer consists of an adaptor to enable
the use of different public or private blockchains.
ShoCard uses distributed data stores in the form of side chains
for identity information. Furthermore, verification data can be
stored on public or private blockchains. From the white paper
[21] it can be derived that the service layer tends to be a
centralised access point, despite being differently stated.
In summary, the proposed blockchain-based identity provider
infrastructure seems to implement a significant point of
centralisation. Based on this, ShoCard becomes a trusted
third party and, from our point of view, the application of
blockchain technology might not be mandatory.
VII. CONCLUSION
Blockchain technology has been undergoing tremendous
hype based on numerous projects and initial coin offerings.
A reasonable application needs to consider the remediation of
central governance and the management of digital objects as
key factors. We incorporated these key factors into a new two-
phase decision model. Subsequently, we used the first stage
to evaluate the identity management domain in general. The
identity provider is an ideal, trusted third party that can be
reasonably replaced by decentralising trust using a blockchain.
A challenge is to ensure the validity and correctness of proper-
ties of a digital identity without introducing dependencies on
other trusted third parties. Afterwards, we applied the second
phase to diverse projects in this domain and were able to
draw specific conclusions. The architecture of uPort ideally
utilises the benefits of a blockchain. Sovrin may introduce trust
centralisation based on a strict governance framework. The
solution architecture of ShoCard may not require a blockchain.
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